Why are there preparations for war

As the Chinese say: two tigers cannot live on the same mountain. Harvard University military historian Graham Allison says any conflict would "get worse before it gets worse", meaning it will escalate to drag in countries throughout the Indo-Pacific, perhaps even globally. The author of the book Destined for War, Allison says it could become a nuclear war. Australia is in the crosshairs of this new great power rivalry: on one side the US, our key strategic ally, and on the other our biggest trading partner, China.

Gone is the idea that we don't have to choose. Australia has chosen the US. We are paying a price with a deteriorating relationship with China and our exporters are suffering.

It's a reflection of an increasingly hostile outlook. Prime Minister Scott Morrison has characterised this moment as one "that is poorer, that is more dangerous and that is more disorderly". The so-called Quad grouping — Australia, India, Japan and US — is stepping up its cooperation to try to contain or thwart China's ambitions and increasing aggressiveness. The Quad has been widely praised as an example of a resurgent democratic alliance in Asia.

Yet questions remain, particularly about India and Japan. Tokyo has so far successfully more successfully than Australia managed its relationship with China, its biggest trading partner — despite historic enmity and ongoing territorial disputes. Japan has avoided the types of trade bans China has applied to Australia.

Would it risk its interests to defend Australia? Of course, Japan is closely aligned to the US. But there are those who have questioned America's resolve and in recent years — particularly under former Prime Minister Abe — there has been a push for Japan to reform its pacifist constitution and strengthen its military posture.

And what of India? It clashed with China last year along their disputed border, with casualties on both sides. It has a long history of remaining non-aligned.

It faces a nuclear armed hostile neighbour, Pakistan, that has close ties with China. India faces much more immediate and perilous threats than Australia. Would it stay the course if tensions escalate? An autocratic figure once banned from entering the US who promotes Hindu nationalism, he is accused of suppressing the votes of Muslims and other minorities and winding back media freedom. India and Japan also pursue their own international relationships and have close ties to countries hostile to the US.

India has relied on Russia as its biggest weapons supplier and tacitly supported Vladimir Putin's annexation of Crimea. Delhi has brokered its own trilateral arrangement with Moscow and Tokyo in part to assuage Russian concern about the Quad. To China, the Quad is a Cold War-style bloc. It appears as a 20th century solution — maintaining US hegemony — to a 21st century problem of incorporating and balancing rising Chinese authoritarian power.

Clearly this is an historical moment that, as history reminds us, if mishandled can end in disaster. The emergence of big powers unsettles the world. Britain's empire was built on brutal colonisation and war, including war with China. Discussion surrounding the need for the Army to reimagine and reconfigure itself began as early as , when then president Barack Obama announced a pivot to Asia, which recognized China as a peer competitor and national security priority.

The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy indicated a commitment to begin shifting priorities away from the irregular warfare being fought in Afghanistan and Iraq and toward preparations for a large-scale conventional fight. These documents clearly recognized China and Russia as primary national security threats, which the US military must be prepared to compete with, deter, and—if necessary—defeat on the battlefield.

Army leaders across the force have made it very clear what the Army is preparing for. A military force prepared for a peer competitor is radically different than a force designed to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

From the ways leaders and soldiers are trained and educated to how units are designed and the equipment and capabilities they wield, the Army is undergoing a broad transformation—a major departure from the two decades of small, incremental changes that were necessary as it fought two major irregular conflicts at once.

At the installation known as the home of the infantry and armor, the MCoE is executing a vision of building smarter, faster, and more lethal combat soldiers, leaders, and formations. Major changes like extending one-station unit training to twenty-two weeks for most combat military occupational specialties in order to build physical prowess, mental aptitude, and tactical and marksmanship proficiencies have been occurring over the past few years to prepare a future force ready for the next fight.

Soldiers are also training with the most advanced military equipment, participating in more tactical exercises, and firing more live rounds than ever before. As a result, the skills, proficiencies, and lethality of infantry and armor soldiers arriving at their first duty stations are greater than ever. These are the foundational changes the future force will be built on: highly fit, proficient, intelligent, and agile soldiers and leaders prepared to operate in any environment, against any adversary.

These technologies are designed to increase the speed, lethality, and all-domain superiority of Army formations. A critical element of Army efforts is focusing on tasks only the Army can perform in combat. While all services are experiencing similar transitions and developing technologies at a fervent pace, Army leaders know that dominating ground combat and influencing populations are areas specifically relevant to the Army, and vital to succeeding in future conflicts.

To be sure, there is still work to be done. Not only does the service need to prepare for a form of conflict radically different from recent wars, but change must also be rapid enough to keep pace with the changing character of warfare—and the growing capabilities of our potential adversaries.

Great power competitors like China and Russia are undertaking efforts to modernize their militaries for increasingly complex battlefields. They are engaging in irregular tactics using proxy forces , seeking advantage in the information environment and cyber domain , and advancing technologies for contested environments like dense urban terrain.

Those of us who have the opportunity to serve as leaders in the Army must recognize the reality of the situation, and constantly reinforce the need to make an intellectual break with past experiences.

We must solidify the hard-earned lessons of our recent past in doctrine and lessons-learned repositories so that they are not lost. But, we must also evolve, build upon, or sometimes even discard practices that are not designed for a peer conflict.

As an example, we are still finding some Army training scenarios that include proxy militias as the opposing force, or include events like key leader engagements with local leaders or pursuits of a single fighter with an RPG or AK through a small village. The forces we present to our soldiers and units in training, education, and leader development events must be based on real-world, peer enemy threats.

Scenarios, historical vignettes, reading lists, and training environments need to be oriented toward the future fight. Our mental and physical preparations must match our equipment and technology modernizations. We must cognitively get east of the Vistula and north of the Han , ready for the potential for large-scale, conventional war in Eastern Europe or the Pacific region. Major General Patrick J. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

The aphorism brought up by the authors in the introduction is what the US Army is currently doing, but instead of fighting the last war, it is fighting the war before the last war and possibly the war before that war ; It should be fighting the future war, now.

I would argue the authors, and the US Army, largely view innovation as providing better tech to our soldiers and integrating tech into training. Tech is a very important aspect of innovation and modernization, but there are other substantially larger problems that need innovative solutions prior to the next conflict. The initial cost of a conventional conflict with a near-peer adversary will most likely be high; All those active duty soldiers we poured the majority of time and resources into can be at a fraction of their strength in a short period of time.

What is the replacement plan? How do those replacements rapidly acquire the skills they need to not only survive, but thrive, in a harsh uncertain combat environment? Moreover, has the Maneuver Center of Excellence discussed the potential need of replacements in a time of war with US Army Recruiting Command and discussed possible innovations to recruitment in order to ensure replacements are volunteers and have some sort of knowledge base before the conflict even begins, instead of relying on crash-course trained draftees in the worst case scenario?

As evident by the example above, innovation is needed to update antiquated policies and structures that have largely been unchanged for decades to prepare for the future war, now. Tech will not be the answer to everything. This given that:. In circumstances such as these, the goal of the "resisting transformation" great powers i. Bringing to the fight, supporting and "mixing and matching" as many of the threatened "status quo" entities and players as possible.

Given the fact of the U. Given this fact, then our strategy for "winning" that is: achieving meaningful political, economic, social and value change both at home and abroad ; this must now take into account:. Not only the full array of our "status quo" "enemies" those both here at home and there abroad; as I have described them above but, also,. Bottom bottom line thought — based on the above: Much as the singular focus on counterinsurgency was wrong back then, likewise the singular focus on great power competition today is wrong; this, due to [a] the many and varied "status quo" enemies that I have described above and [b] the many and varied ways that these enemies, under good leadership [and potentially in a modular way?

The premise of this article is spot on. Ophelia is grateful for the advice, however, she mentions that Laertes should follow his own advice as well. He promises to be wise in his relationships. Polonius enters. He gives some pieces of advice to Laertes: to dress well, not to lend money, not to get into arguments, listen to others but not let everybody know his own thoughts.

Ophelia tells her father that Hamlet expresses sympathy towards her. He, just like Laertes, calls upon Ophelia to preserve her chastity and be less welcoming to Hamlet. Place and time of the scene: Same post as in Scene 1 where guards take on duty. It is a cold night.

Hamlet and two of his companions are standing outside at their post. It is midnight, previously, the ghost appeared around this time. They hear sounds of trumpets — the king is celebrating. Hamlet is disgusted — he says that this drinking custom should be abandoned as it damages the reputation of the country.

And the ghost appears again. At first, Hamlet is unsure whether the ghost is friendly or not. He asks his father what made him leave his grave. The ghost gives Hamlet a sign to follow him.

Horatio and Marcellus notice it as well, but advise him not to go. They are worried that by following the ghost Hamlet puts himself in danger — he might die or go insane. Despite numerous attempts to stop him, Hamlet follows the ghost into darkness. He says that he is brave and will not tolerate anybody getting in his way of following the ghost. Marcellus and Horatio think that Hamlet is out of his mind, they decide to follow the young prince. Place and time of the scene: Same post as in Scene 1, but from a different side, further away from the eyes of the other guards.

Hamlet follows the ghost. The ghost tells him that he is condemned to walk around at night and burn in the fire during the day. He says that he knows a terrible secret.

He starts talking about the murder and revenge… Hamlet doesn't understand, but he is ready to avenge his beloved father.

The ghost confided that while everybody thought that a snake bit the king, it was actually Claudius who murdered the monarch. The ghost also accuses his wife, Gertrude, that she colluded with the enemy when married Claudius. But he wants Hamlet to spare her.

He thinks she will drive herself crazy with remorse and twinges of consciousness. The ghost leaves, while Hamlet is full of emotions. He is determined to fulfill his promise to his father and take revenge. Horatio and Marcellus enter when the ghost is already gone. Instead, Hamlet starts speaking weirdly. He asks the two to keep quiet about what happened that night.

The ghost speaks from below without showing himself and also wants them to promise that they will keep quiet. However, Shakespeare managed to put his character in the very heart of the events. Yet, they tell about the ghost encounter to Horatio and then to Hamlet. Shakespeare also made Hamlet stand out in Scene 2, where he is the only one wearing somber clothes on the background of predominant celebrating mood in the castle.